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NAVAL ARMS CONTROL: A POOR CHOICE OF WORDS AND AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS YET TO COME

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Author makes case that due to recent events, initiatives in areas of naval arms control are extremely poorly timed. These events include political changes in USSR, the changing international security environment, the new Soviet military doctrine and strategy, ongoing arms control negotiations, unarticulated U.S. and NATO goals, and changes in Soviet and U.S. planning assumptions and scenarios. Author then analyses three major areas for naval arms control proposals: (1) restrictions on strategic antisubmarine warfare, (2) naval operations, and (3) strategic antisubmarine warfare technology and fanks them on technical grounds. Author reviews the goals of arms control and finds none of these three areas in need of formal regulation. Author concludes with a number of innovative areas for naval arms control in areas of doctrine, strategy, operations, and exercises with concrete recommendations and acceptable (to USN) fallback positions. (KR)

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"Naval" Arms Control:
A Poor Choice of Words And An Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come

"Naval" Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words And An Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come

James J. Tritten[1]

With the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, a revolution in military affairs, has focused arms control attention in major countries primarily on strategic and other nuclear weapons. Limiting conventional forces, naval weapons, and other aspects of naval warfare has been largely ignored but show signs of life. Euphoria over the recent U.S.- USSR intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) arms control treaty, "glasnost," "perestroika," the new Soviet defensive military doctrine, and both Western and Soviet anxiety to reduce - or at least curb - the growth of military expenditures, is shifting attention to conventional, naval, and other forms of arms control.

Despite the rather extensive record of arms control, specifically arms control between the superpowers, proponents of "naval" arms control appear to be reinventing the wheel. They ignore the rich lessons of previous non-maritime endeavors and the enormous literature on the subject. From advocate pronouncements, getting a treaty appears their goal, rather than the standard benefits attributed to arms control.

The arms control community reached consensus in the early 1960s on three basic goals of arms control.[2] First, the likelihood of war should be reduced because of reduced military capabilities and a reduction in the fear over a first strike. Second, if war breaks out, the limited availability of weapons should

reduce the consequences of the war. Third, there should be a reduction in the costs of maintaining military forces because of limitations on weaponry, personnel, and/or operations.

These criteria should be used to assess the worth of past agreements and any suggested arms control measures. A treaty or the lack thereof, are <u>not</u> serious measures of the effectiveness or success of a nation's arms control efforts. Further, if these goals can be attained without a treaty or other formal arrangement, then negotiations would appear unnecessary. Proponents of "naval" arms control should make their case for such controls on the likelihood of a suggested measure meeting these goals, for they are not being met by other means.

Some of the most recent arms control initiatives for the sea services, their possible consequences to naval operations, and restrictions on the development of future maritime technology, are the subjects of this paper. It focuses on "naval" arms control initiatives in three main areas proposed by supporters: restrictions on strategic antisubmarine warfare and similar measures to "safeguard" strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines at sea; limitations on naval operations on the high seas; and regulations regarding specific maritime antisubmarine warfare technologies. The paper also address the timing of these arms control initiatives, their priorities in national security affairs, and whether naval forces should be subjected to controls in the absence of analogous controls over nuclear and land forces. It is these important questions that I first address.

The Poor Timing of Recent Arms Control Initiatives

Perhaps the most important message in this paper is that, even accepting the value of arms control over the sea services, this is singularly the worst time since World War II to engage in such negotiations. Accepting the subordination of military doctrine and strategy to policy is the key to understanding this argument.

The Changing Soviet Union

The U.S. and NATO have, for the past forty years, focused their political-military planning and arms control efforts mainly on the most dangerous nation they faced, the Soviet Union. Until recently, the USSR was fairly predictable; there were well-articulated programs and policies in the open literature, the Soviet force structure matched those declaratory policies, and exercises and deployments reinforced both. Trends over time indicated a deliberate and fairly constant defense doctrine and military strategy.

The West needed to watch only a few Soviet spokesmen whose open-source programs and platforms were relatively consistent. We could (and did) ignore the government and party leaders of Eastern European countries, and even the Soviet government, to watch what the Soviet party and military leadership said. We generally ignored the internal debates within the party and military and concentrated only on the outcome of the debates; usually a major policy statement by the most senior party and military leaders involved, the fielding of a new weapons system,

or a deployment of forces. We watched programs and force employments follow official policy, with few mismatches. We assumed, that fielded capability represented the final expression of intent.

That world is gone and is unlikely to return. President Mikhail Gorbachev has shifted real political power from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and its elite Politburo, to a new Presidential Council and the government of the USSR. The CPSU is considering surrendering its constitutional right to rule the USSR, and communist parties in Eastern European nations no longer hold power. Few care anymore who heads the communist parties in Eastern Europe. Did anyone predict this might happen one year ago?

Is may not even matter who heads the CPSU next year. Contingency planning in the West must include the possibility that the Soviet Union, as we know it, will eventually break up, and multiple international states take its place. We need to analyze what happened to treaties entered into by federations or similar unions, later dissolved into discrete political actors.[3] After the 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks repudiated all Tsarist treaties. Can we be assured that a naval arms control treaty with a Soviet government headed by President Gorbachev will be binding on an independent Lithuania? This is not a mere academic point, since future independent Baltic republics may inherit some units of the former USSR's Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet or the border patrol forces.

The West has not had to consider major changes in the Soviet party leadership and programs since World War II. Although the abrupt changes we are witnessing appear for the better, we must consider that future changes in leadership and programs may be for the worse. In 1933, the government of Germany underwent a major change. Up until then, marginal cheating on arms control agreements by Germany were taken seriously but did not cause significant alarm. After the 1933 change in government, marginal cheating proved downright dangerous to the stability of the world's democracies.[4] Even if we believe that changes in the USSR are leading to a better world, the West must hedge its strategies for a possible reversal. Such strategies must address the minor noncompliance of arms control agreements that even friendly nations demonstrate.

Even if the USSR survives relatively intact, there is a new legislative oversight committee within the Supreme Soviet, the Committee on Defense and State Security, with cognizance over security and defense. The committee is not totally a rubber stamp for President Gorbachev, nor a parallel to either the U.S. Senate or House Armed Service Committees. This embryonic involvement by the legislature is already changing the smooth running of the Soviet "military-industrial complex."

President Gorbachev has opened the realm of national defense to individuals who have not been major participants. For example, in July 1988, a major conference was held on the future international security environment and how it would effect the Soviet Union. Most interesting was that this conference was

sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not the Ministry of Defense.[5] Not too many years ago Soviet civilian strategic nuclear arms negotiators were not given force structure data by the Soviet military since they did not have a "need to know."

Academics from various institutes in the USSR have always written about defense matters but the West could (and did) generally ignore them since there was little correlation between this literature and Soviet military literature, deployed hardware, actual exercises, and deployment patterns. Today, the most extraordinary articles by a wide variety of civilian academics in the institutes appear to provide close correlation between their articles and where the Soviet military appears to be heading. In open source literature, there is significant opposition to civilian academics from the Soviet military. From the tone of the debate, it appears that the military has lost influence and clearly resents the external meddling from this new crop of McNamara-style "whiz-kids."

Five years ago, few in the West would have taken the civilian literature very seriously, unless it was corroborated by military evidence. Today we see the Soviet Chief of the General Staff resorting to writing in his own in-house newspaper to communicate what he would have said, if allowed to speak, at a February 1990 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.[6]

In short, there is a new cast of characters running, or participating in running, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It is not clear how long they will remain in power, and how much

power each of these actors can exert. My point is that we are witnessing a major restructuring (perestroika) of real political power in the USSR, and it is not certain (July 1990) to whom we should be listening.

For example, when Georgi Sturua, from the USSR Institute of World Economy and International Relations, told a Western audience in June 1990 that the Soviet Union is no longer interested in "naval" arms control because inter alia it has more important things to do, does this presage a new government policy?[7] Formerly, conformity to a strict "party line" was the norm and we would assume that Sturua was authorized to float a trial balloon. The West will now have to debate whether Dr. Sturua is an authorized spokesman and seek corroboration that government (or party) policy is changing. We will also have to evaluate the positions of other nations still nominally in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and not assume that their positions parallel those of the Soviet government or CPSU.

Even if we assume that President Gorbachev will remain in power beyond the next two years (he declared he would resign if his economic reforms did not show progress within that time) and Georgi Sturua is wrong (the Soviet government still wants to negotiate a "naval arms control" agreement with the U.S.), this is the wrong time to deal with third or fourth order issues such as "naval arms control." There are more important things to be settled.

The Changing International Security Environment

Another primary reason to avoid a major maritime arms control agreement is that we are in the midst of a major and stressful restructuring of the international political and security environment. We do not know what that world will look like, but it is likely to be less bipolar and more multipolar than was common in the past forty-five years. We intuitively "know" that navies will be used for certain tasks but those tasks are set in the context of an international security and political environment undergoing major changes.

Political scientists have been predicting a changed world for many years. Today, we are actually watching Soviet troops pull out of Eastern Europe; the U.S. government (not just a few legislators) is seriously considering recalling all combat troops from Western Europe; and a proliferation of other threats that have not been taken seriously for years are now receiving attention at the highest levels of the U.S., Soviet, and European governments.

If we are to consider threats other than the USSR seriously, we must understand the same things about the rest of the world that we did about the Soviet Union when the U.S. Navy publicized its Maritime Strategy. It took the United States much time and effort to avoid the mirror-imaging problems and develop the capability to assess Soviet views on war, strategy, and employment of navies as well as time to develop its own strategies.

No intelligence service today can claim it understands the views on war, and the role of navies, of the rest of the world. That remainder, incidentally, has at least as many submarines as the two superpowers. Until we understand how navies might be used in future armed conflicts and crises that do not involve the USSR, it is difficult to design strategies for their employment, let alone force structures and operating requirements.

Likely, we will need to devise radically different military scenarios for crises and war, not only wars and crises in Europe; scenarios to which we (and the Soviets and Europeans) are not accustomed and have not thought through. Until new national objectives and strategies have been conceived and tested, why should anyone even consider restricting fleet capabilities?

If the world coastal states were unwilling to restrict superpower access to their shores by suturing international straits when the territorial sea was extended to twelve nautical miles, why should we assume that they would want to deny access by restricting superpower maritime capability? A major reason these nations ensured access despite a new Law of the Sea Treaty was so that if they wanted a superpower fleet off their shores, it would have no trouble getting there. My point is: these same coastal states may still feel that way and not want to see restrictions on superpower naval operations or capabilities. We should ask them.

If both superpowers return their ground forces to their homelands, war planning (it will go on) may more resemble that of

the inter-war years than the Cold War. The 10-day war, or bolt for the Rhine will be less interesting scenarios than long (1-2 year) mobilizations by totalitarian nations matched by the halting, inadequate responses by democracies. War planning will focus not just on the few scenarios that have enraptured us for the past forty-five years but may include contingencies for which all major nations lack sufficient specialist cadres within government.

It is possible that democracies will no longer engage in a zero-sum game with the CPSU because the public repudiation of peaceful coexistence as just another form of the class struggle is real.[8] If we can relinquish the zero-sum game mentality, then we should examine very seriously a series of comprehensive proposals for a new international security environment proposed by President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.[9] This should be our first order effort, not control of naval forces, operations, and maritime technology.

A New Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy

Another first order issue is that we know that the military policy of the CPSU has been radically altered making the prevention of war a most serious goal of Soviet military doctrine. Soviet and Warsaw Treaty Organization military doctrine has been altered and openly published. Even if the CPSU loses its constitutional guarantee of leadership of the USSR, whatever government follows will retain a similar strategic culture. It likely would formulate a military policy and doctrine that is similar; i.e. a

non-communist USSR or a number of independent republics from the former USSR would not casually embark on a confrontational foreign and military policy with the West.

There were debates in the Soviet Union over this new military policy and the supportive defensive military doctrine. Subsequently, changes were made to Soviet military strategy - the strategy governing the employment of their fleet. The changes in doctrine and strategy appear real and they do matter. We are witnessing significant changes in ground force structure, deployments, exercises, and concomitant changes to the Soviet military literature at the strategic and operational levels of armed conflict. These changes will affect Soviet government plans to use its military forces (including naval forces) in peace, crisis (period of rising tensions), war, and the termination of a crisis or war.

From the available evidence, at least four variants for defense of the USSR were openly debated. The first was the traditional active defense with forces fighting on enemy territory at the groups of fronts level in a theater strategic offensive operation. The West understands this variant of defense and had responsive intelligence, military, and political programs to ensure the peace.

The second variant was modeled after the historic 1943 Battle of Kursk, which included superiority over the enemy but allowed the enemy to strike first and wear himself out. The initial defense would be rapidly followed by a lightning counterof-

fensive at the groups of fronts level, transferring the theater strategic operation to enemy territory. The problem with variant two is that the force structure and eventual offensive capability are virtually identical to variant one. The West would be no more secure under this option, even though the associated doctrine and strategy are "defensive."

The third variant is modeled after the fourth period (July 10, 1951 - July 27, 1953) of the Korean War, or the 1939 Khalkin Gol operation in Manchuria against the Japanese. Under this model, Soviet forces would have the defensive capability to defend their own territory (even actively but only at the tactical and operational levels) and repel an invader but not to go on the offensive at the groups of front level and fight on enemy territory. Victory is limited to the tactical and operational levels of warfare and the counteroffensive is only at the front level. Such a variant would significantly change planning by the Soviet military and the perception of the threat by the West. One unanswered question is, how long would military operations remain at this relatively low level before full mobilization took place and other options presented themselves?

In a November 1989 interview, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev, military advisor to the current Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, stated specific views on crises or war termination which might provide insight on the timing of initial defensive operations limited to repulsing an invader to the Soviet border. Akhromeyev implied that the defensive role during the initial period of a future war, would allow the political

leadership the opportunity to terminate it. Failing that, the military would be unleashed to perform their normal function of crushing and decisively routing the enemy (emphasis added):[10]

> "The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states that the first large-scale operations that we may engage in will be of a purely defensive kind, aimed at repelling aggression. I think that these operations will last long enough - they may last several weeks. We imagine that during this period the Warsaw Pact political leadership will take steps aimed at localizing the conflict and preventing the unleashing of a full-scale war. However, if it does not become possible to resolve the conflict by employing political means, then it is difficult at the present time to imagine how events would develop. Both sides would develop their armed forced in accordance with their plans for wartime."

A fourth variant of defense suggested that the attacker would simply wear himself out but Soviet forces could not even repel the invading army. This variant was not taken seriously since it was decidedly non-Russian, non-Soviet, would preclude victory at even the operational level of warfare, and would result in war termination with an invading army on Soviet territory.

Apparently, the third variant has been chosen and this change in doctrine and strategy is significantly changing the requirements, and roles and missions, for the Soviet Navy. We are just beginning to understand the multiple meanings of these new war termination words (above) by Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev and it may be some time before the Soviets conclude their analysis of all aspects of the strategy and operational art.

The dramatic changes in doctrine and strategy cause commensurate debates over the roles and missions of the Soviet Navy. Any discussion of "naval" arms control would put the cart before the horse. What do the Soviet government (or party) and marshals want their fleets to do in the event of a crisis or war? Even they are uncertain.

Under old Soviet military strategy, there were four basic strategic missions for the Soviet Armed Forces; (1) strikes, primarily by nuclear missiles, (2) military operations in a land theater, (3) defense of the nation from enemy strikes, and (4) military operations in naval theaters. The fourth strategic mission (maritime) was always considered indecisive and thus the Soviet Navy was always the fifth rank military service.

Evidence suggests that the strategic missions of the Soviet Armed Forces have been restructured; (1) repelling enemy aerospace attack, (2) suppression of enemy military-economic potential, and (3) disruption of groups of enemy forces.[11] It is not clear if these new missions are official Ministry of Defense missions, yet the West has no choice but to take these new strategic missions seriously and assess how the Soviet Navy fits into them.

Figures 1 and 2 present the results of my original analysis that attempts to fit standard Soviet fleet missions into the traditional and possibly new strategic missions assigned the Armed Forces of the USSR. It is not clear whether the debate within the USSR over service roles and missions is settled, hence

these figures may be only a snapshot of the Soviet Navy's position, circa Spring 1990.

It does appear, however, that the Soviet Navy may have actually increased in importance, which explains the lack of serious cuts in its force structure while major cuts are scheduled and/or occurring in strategic nuclear and ground forces. Analysis of either Figure 1 or 2 is a useful starting place to move from political goals in a war or armed conflict to major military missions, and understand how each Soviet military service will be used. Both Figures 1 and 2 show the connection between military operations/actions at the strategic level of armed conflict and combat operations/actions at the operational and tactical levels. Original Russian words are in parentheses, where appropriate, to ensure that the reader can correctly place key phrases in this diagram.[12]



Figure 1
TRADITIONAL SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS



Figure 2
POSSIBLE NEW SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS

The Soviet Navy's strategic role in modern war between the superpowers, where global operations were assumed relatively brief and perhaps nuclear, was considered generally limited to threatening nuclear missile strikes from protected bastions.[13] Protecting the bastions would consume a major portion of the Soviet surface and subsurface fleet, operating in a defensive role but engaged in offensive tactics. Another important strategic mission for the Soviet Navy has traditionally been to assist the Soviet ground forces in theater strategic operations ashore.

Recently, the Soviet Navy was tasked with an increased role in defense of the nation against enemy strikes from the sea, a role they share with the Soviet Air Defense Troops (PVO). Military operations on the high seas has been a long-term and basically unfunded goal due to a cultural conceptual bias and misunderstanding of navies by the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces and CPSU. It remains an unmet need unless one assumes that the aircraft carriers currently being built constitute the core of an offensive maritime force.

The Soviet Navy's discussion of these new strategic missions may be an attempt to revise the widespread lack of appreciation for the maritime sector by the marshals and generals and to explain once again how maritime forces can be used to achieve political goals in armed conflicts. What should be <u>very</u> clear, however, is that with service roles and missions being revised, there should be no negotiations over naval force structure or operations until that debate has ended. If the Soviet have not settled how they intend to use their Navy in war, why should we

feel comfortable limiting our own capabilities to match any expected threat. Set into the context of simultaneous major economic and political upheaval in the USSR, the wisdom of even thinking about "naval" arms control is open to serious question.

Ongoing Arms Control Negotiations

There are additional major second order reasons for not engaging in arms control for the sea services at the present time. Most important is the lack of agreement on nuclear arms control negotiations, let alone successful ratification of any treaty by the U.S. Senate (the last strategic nuclear treaty was never ratified and it never entered force). The complex relationship of nuclear forces and capabilities to conventional, and especially naval, forces is a topic on which I have written elsewhere and will not repeat.[14]

I would emphasize that we must first successfully conclude our bilateral strategic nuclear force arrangements, and see them ratified, before engaging in conventional naval negotiations. For example, how many ballistic missile submarines will be deployed, and will each superpower continue to program forces capable of attacking these submarines in the conventional phase of a war? Are there symbiotic force employment options precluded by cutting conventional naval forces? Nuclear issues are second order questions that immediately stem from aforementioned political ones. They are of more importance than "naval" arms control and must be settled first.

An additional reason to delay maritime arms control is that it is now obvious that conventional land and ground forces are undergoing drastic restructuring in Europe and may themselves be the subjects of a successful arms control agreement in the near future. Will all Soviet troops return to the homeland? Will the USSR actually adopt variant three as the programming and war planning model? Will the U.S. and Great Britain bring their troops home from the continent? Does France leave troops in the united Germany? What type troops are found in the former German Democratic Republic? Will the German-Polish border question be resurrected? What happens if the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary become neutral and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact? These are all very important second order questions that need to be settled before considering the role of navies in future wars, let alone negotiating limits to our maritime options.

Unarticulated U.S. and NATO Goals

The U.S. and NATO are changing their basic strategic-military focus. Just as the Soviet military appears to be behind the curve on articulating future direction, the U.S. defense establishment is currently (June 1990) fighting a catch-up game with Congress. The American legislature, going through its normal tortuous budgetary processes, will create its own version of American strategies and priorities because it was not offered realistic choices by the executive branch of government.

When the Congress completes its budget actions and the President signs the appropriate legislation, the executive branch

will open the planning process with an evaluation of the resources available, and guidance on goals and objectives provided by the legislature. The Department of Defense staffs will then begin designing new national and national security goals, objectives, and strategies. By then, the U.S. should have a more perceptive appreciation of the comprehensive threat. Arms control should follow this process, not precede it.

Changes in Planning Assumptions and Scenarios

The likelihood of war in Europe is lower than it has been for many years. Both sides can actually change their planning assumptions and count on strategic warning measured in months, not on the tactical warning of an attack of only a few hours or days. These changes are <u>not</u> insignificant and they affect naval forces. We have not begun to appreciate the changes that major increases in warning times will have on sealift and fleet requirements. These implications should be understood before we confine ourselves to a box that may prove poorly designed, once we understand the new international and military environment.

Naval forces do not exist in isolation. They must have relevance and value in what occurs ashore. However, for the near term, we are essentially incapable of deciding what we would like to do ashore, or even what a war might look like, given the new Europe. If we cannot settle these first order political and second order military questions, then why should we consider major modifications to lower order forces that, if changed in the wrong manner, might seriously affect our ability to influence

what goes on ashore - once we finally agree on what we would like to do there.

The full spectrum of "other" threats need additional research and alternative solutions and force structures debated. For example, do we resolve the threat of an oil disruption by continuing to invest national treasure in a military (especially naval, sealift, and Marine Corps) capability designed to seize or defend the oil by force or by filling the strategic petroleum reserve and supporting alternative sources and conversions? Congress is unlikely to do both over the long haul, nor should they.

With the demise of old threats (from both the Western and Soviet perspective), maritime specialists must consider fundamental questions to justify existing programs. For example, U.S. submarines have generally been justified in terms of the Soviet threat. If that threat is no longer taken seriously, can we justify submarines with other missions such as naval diplomacy, and have them available in case the Soviet conversion changes again?[15] Similarly, certain classes of Soviet submarines and their modernization of older models have been justified in part by the need to interdict mid-ocean sea lines of communication. In the new world of defensive defense with both superpowers essentially back in their homelands, it becomes more difficult to justify such offensive forces.

Although no one has a monopoly on predicting the future force structure and operating budgets for the U.S. Navy, it is

safe to predict that the sea service will be cut but proportionally less than the other services. With the reduced force structure, the U.S. will then call on the Navy to meet and cope with a host of other threats that were ignored while we concentrated on the USSR.

From the Western perspective, it would appear that a continental power like the USSR, especially a land power embracing a defensive doctrine and strategy, does not require certain types of naval forces. Although that is obvious even to some Soviet civilian strategists,[16] aircraft carriers are still being built, modernization continues of the submarine fleet, and newer surface ships are generally more capable than the ones that they replace. This does not make sense to the West and demands further investigation - prior to negotiating any arms control regime.

Technical Criticism of "Naval" Arms Control

I now turn to certain specific proposals for the control of maritime forces which I intend to rebut based upon their technical merits. My general argument is that, in addition to being an extraordinarily poor time to engage in naval forces negotiations for the aforementioned reasons, the major proposals floated are all fatally flawed. In short, despite the very good reasons to avoid maritime arms control negotiations now, navies may have to explain why the proposals themselves are shallow and faulty.

Restrictions on Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare

Some academic community civilians question certain offensive operations termed "strategic" antisubmarine warfare (ASW) or ASW operations against strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs). Proponents suggest that arms controls regulate such operations. Proposals to restrict deployments of SSBNs and limit strategic ASW have been around for decades, attracting the support of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and, more recently, CPSU General Secretary and President Mikhail Gorbachev with a supporting cast of military officers and foreign ministry spokesmen.

Most of these proposals create "safe zones" in which SSBNs can be deployed. Within these zones <u>all</u> ASW operations would be forbidden. Hence such zones would restrict virtually <u>all</u> warships, hydrographic vessels and naval auxiliaries from operating in vast areas of the high seas since it could be argued that even during routine transit by these ships they conduct certain (and not trivial) phases of antisubmarine warfare. For example, ships transiting the ocean normally conduct visual and radar (if equipped) search - both forms of active ASW. Even passive search using basic electronics equipment is expected during the most routine and innocent transits, and most naval ships carry some electronic support measures (ESM) equipment. ESM, radar, and visual search are surprisingly effective and routinely used methods of ASW.

Safe zones would logically restrict ASW <u>research</u> (scientific study of the environment that could advance ASW technology or

capability) as well as actual ASW operations; otherwise, a major loophole would allow treaty circumvention and non-compliance. If a nation claims it is doing only ASW research off a port from which SSBNs routinely sail, not actual ASW operations, it is likely that this research might result in the "unintended" conduct of actual ASW against a significant target. Even if no SSBN sailed in the area while research was being conducted, the research would significantly enhance the ability of the "enemy" nation to conduct ASW if it were to abrogate the agreement barring such restrictions.

Virtually all military ships conduct ASW "research" during normal transit - fathometer soundings, bathythermograph readings and other routine observations on the condition of the seas. These soundings, readings, and other observations may sound trivial to the land-oriented individual, but they are crucial to the conduct of ASW, especially in shallow waters. Therefore, a ban on ASW research essentially means a ban on the passage of any warship capable of conducting these basic readings, or virtually any warship.

If ASW safe areas cause difficulties for warships, we should consider the difficulties similar restrictions place on fishing vessels and merchant ships. All Soviet ships are state-owned. In the West, many civilian ships are contracted for military related support services; hence, any visual or radar searches, fathometer soundings, bathythermograph readings, sea state recordings, or studies of marine biology by these ships must be considered

state-run or sponsored ASW operations or research. An ASW free zone, therefore, would have to be off-limits to any state-owned or contracted merchant or fishing vessel.

Forbidding vast areas of the ocean to transit by national flag vessels is clearly not in the best interest of either superpower or any maritime nation. How would the U.S. fishing, oil, and minerals industries react to being told they could not conduct routine ocean observations or exploration in the Gulf of Alaska? How would the Canadian government feel if it was forbidden to send coastal patrol vessels into the Arctic regions outside its own territorial sea or internal waters?

Analyzing such an arms control regime, verification problems abound. Should the West wish to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is not complying with ASW restrictions or restrictions on the use of "safe" areas, but can do so only by exposing its own sophisticated technical or intelligence capabilities, it must choose between exposing the non-compliance and the related intelligence source or not publicizing the violation. Unfortunately, democracies have a poor track record, generally choosing not to publicize "minor" violations, thus inviting totalitarian nations to take even further liberties with treaties.

Even if compliance can be verified, the net effect of any restrictions on strategic ASW or SSBN operations benefits the Soviet Union more than the West. In effect, the restrictions demand that the West identify the ocean areas in which its strategic missile-carrying submarines are deployed, something we now

avoid at all costs. Identification of deployment areas to designate ASW free zones greatly eases Soviets ASW search problems. Simply put, we would greatly reduce the large oceanic area where the Soviet Union looks for U.S. SSBNs. If we identify search areas for SSBNs, we probably weaken Western deterrence, including the deterrent umbrella extended by the U.S. over its non-nuclear Allies.

The U.S. has never built the maximum number of SSBNs allowed under the SALT I agreement. As we reduce further the number of SSBNs, it is in our and our Allies interests to keep the Soviet's search problem as complicated as possible, as a hedge against the long-predicted Soviet breakthrough in ASW. Although many political scientists warn us that the oceans are about to become transparent (that scientists will discover a means to make ocean waters so clear that submarines hidden beneath the surface will be visible from the skies), this breakthrough is still not imminent. Soviet military strategy, however, explicitly requires the use of strategic ASW against enemy missile-carrying submarines in time of war. We should maintain our guard against a possible Soviet breakthrough in ASW capability.

Any reduction of SSBN hulls in the future has three possible implications of major importance. First, substantially reducing the number of targets for Soviet strategic ASW action is a problem that must be constantly monitored by government intelligence agencies assessing enemy ASW warfare capabilities. If we reduce the number of SSBNs to 17 or 18, using a rule of thumb that two-thirds of that force might normally be on patrol, then the Sovi-

ets and their allies would have to search for only 12 targets during normal peacetime patrols. Similarly, if Soviet SSBN numbers are reduced significantly, this will have an effect upon planned maritime operations in war and, therefore, in the planned procurement of ASW capable forces in the West in peace.

Second, if Soviet SSBNs are reduced, the Soviet Navy will likely have surplus general purpose (submarine, surface and air) forces to send into areas of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in time of war. Similarly, the reduction in the number of SSBNs in the West might have an impact in both our planned buy of cruise missile-carrying forces and conventional antisubmarine warfare forces necessary to defend convoys against threats from these extra Soviet forces.

Third, no future arms control agreements with the USSR involving nuclear weapons should accord them a unilateral advantage in using ballistic missile submarine hulls nor exclude the diesel-electric ballistic missile submarines and intermediate-range naval land-based nuclear cruise missile forces currently found in the Soviet Fleets. The USSR was granted unilateral superiority in SALT I submarine hull and launcher numbers due to supposed technological inferiority. That mistake must not be repeated since their technological "inferiority" at sea has been vastly overstated (or at least is no longer as valid) and long-range missiles make unnecessary their firing off the shores of North America.

Just as the possession of nuclear weapons by third nations is an obstacle to strategic nuclear and other arms control negotiations, the possession of missile-carrying submarines and ASW forces by other nations complicates any of the general purpose "naval" arms control proposals mentioned. For example, would the United Kingdom or France deploy their SSBNs in the open ocean if the U.S. and Soviet Union limit their submarines to safe zones? If so, the survivability of these Allied submarines is questionable since they will have to face greater numbers of Soviet ASW forces directed specifically at them. The U.S. generally takes the position that it cannot and will not negotiate Allied nuclear forces while the Soviet Union views all weapons that are capable of hitting its homeland as "strategic."

Similarly, if Soviet ASW forces are not allowed to enter the U.S. ASW-free or "safe" areas, will North Korean or Cuban forces be used instead? If the USSR breaks up shortly after the signing of a treaty, will ships flying the flag of the Ukraine or Belorussiya (currently U.N. members) be bound by any agreement of the old USSR? Reflagging is an ancient maritime tradition, used to reduce the effectiveness of any arms control regime, making treaty compliance virtually impossible to enforce. If reflagging is not used, what prevents nations from benefiting from the ASW or ASW research conducted by its allies? Allies could act as sub-contractors to ensure continued mission performance even in the face of an arms control regime.

My point is that any bilateral agreement involving ASW is basically a non-starter. There are too many ways of circumven-

tion to achieve the desired results. If this type of agreement is desired, it must be comprehensive and involve all nations legally capable of deploying a navy.

In addition, any arms control limitations on antisubmarine warfare will reduce the opportunities for collecting intelligence, an element of our national technical means (NTMs) of verifying compliance with arms control agreements. Most people equate NTMs with satellite activities. Naval forces, however, have the rights of transit and intelligence gathering on the high seas. If sea operations are restricted, banning the use of radar, visual and ESM "ASW" search equipment, these same naval forces might not be able to undertake necessary observation missions verifying the arms control treaty itself. Most proponents of "naval" arms control do not understand the adverse effects their proposals would have on monitoring current agreements. If they did, they would not favor these proposals.

Most arms control proponents also do not understand the nature of military operations at sea and are more comfortable with land warfare. At sea, sailors live in an environment where shades of gray are the norm and black and white are much more difficult to identify discretely. It is for this reason that navies are normally given more latitude in rules of engagement than land forces.

Navies normally deal with "possible," or "probable," rather than "certain" submarine contacts.[17] The false alarm rate is extraordinarily high at sea and the risks of poor judgment are

more often catastrophic than for forces ashore. To extend arms control to the sea services, we would have to devise special procedures and regimes to deal seriously with the less than "certain" contacts which, if proven valid, would verify noncompliance with rules.

From the failures of the Swedish government to openly declare intrusions into their internal waters and territorial sea to be Soviet in origin, it is likely that governments will demand certain verification of noncompliance. In other words, we will need a smoking gun or "Whisky on the rocks" (an actual Soviet submarine aground in Swedish waters) to "prove" that a nation is not living up to its international obligations.

Navies are not likely to favor eroding their power and influence in what is, until now, clearly their prerogative. If a "possible" submarine is detected off the coast of a nation, it is duly recorded and logged by military officers and intelligence professionals of relatively low rank. If asked by the government, the armed forces or intelligence services can tell their government how many "possible," "probable," or "certain" submarines are, or were, off their shores at any given time. If questioned by the public or the media, the government would use the military's input as the basis for their answer, with due caution respecting intelligence sources and methods.

If the waters off that same nation, however, were declared an ASW free zone, or an otherwise restricted area, as part of a formal arms control regime the government had sponsored, then the

government is more likely to take their military's or intelligence service's input and apply both legal and political finesse to ensure that they report no submarines found in forbidden zones even though in the absence of an arms control regime, the report would be precisely the antithesis. Still, one could conjure up a case where a government of the opposition party might attempt to discredit an arms control agreement negotiated by its predecessor, and manipulate intelligence data to show high levels of noncompliance.

Navies cannot be expected to support any changes to the current agreements where professionals are allowed to make judgments on their own, without legal or political oversight. The case in point is the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar, which had been identified by the intelligence services and the military as being an antiballistic missile (ABM) radar. It was eventually acknowledged by the Soviet Foreign Minister to be an ABM radar but the issue was tied up for years by arms control proponents who argued that it was not a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. If declared an ABM radar, it would undermine the arms control process, hence proponents would not call it an ABM radar.

Restrictions on Naval Operations

Other Soviet recommendations for "naval" arms control include restricting major maritime exercises to one or two each year. Asymmetries in national methods of attaining fleet readiness underlie this proposal. The Soviets believe they maintain high readiness by maintaining an alert status in port or at an

anchorage, not exercising their fleet at sea. Virtually all other navies believe readiness is maintained by maximizing the time they are underway at sea conducting operations. Restricting at-sea time might appear attractive to a new Administration anxious to lower Department of Defense budgets by reducing operating and maintenance costs; however, limiting exercises while suitable for continental powers like the Soviet Union, are clearly impractical for historic sea powers like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Japan.

In addition, proposals to limit the number, location of deployments, or types of forces have been suggested by the USSR. For example, the deployment of a battleship into the Baltic Sea caused an adverse reaction by a Soviet spokesman. Deployed aircraft carrier battle groups near the Soviet homeland are anathema the Russians would also prefer to regulate. Fortunately, we have a historical record of Soviet non-compliance with naval arms control, especially the Montreaux Treaty of 1936. Although one can argue that the USSR has not violated the exact letter of the treaty, a political document subject to interpretation of the government of Turkey, the record highlights a nation that has not been faced any restrictions it would not find a way around.

Proposals on specific ship deployments, besides being asymmetric and self-serving, have two major flaws. First, they undermine the principles of navigational freedom so vital to our military forward deployment strategy and economic well being. I believe navigational freedom is more important to the U.S., its

Allies, and trading partners, than any benefit we may derive from limiting fleet deployments by the Soviets. Second, deployment limits undermine deterrence, especially of our major Allies on exposed flanks. Major fleet task forces of the U.S. Navy remain a visible deterrent to Soviet aggression in the Norwegian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean and as a reminder of our commitment to defend the exposed flanks of Iceland, Norway, Greece and Turkey. If the Soviets desire a reduced U.S. naval presence in these areas, they must be prepared to give up something of equal value.

Soviet proposals for zones of peace, or nuclear free zones at sea, are additional long standing proposals detrimental to NATO maritime strategy that would adversely complicate U.S. Navy operations. Such zones lend themselves to large regional varieties, such as a zone of peace for the Indian Ocean or, in more limited geographic areas, like the Baltic Sea. Aggregated on a map, they virtually encircle the Soviet Union providing it a defensive buffer. National defense is a laudable goal for any nation, and we appreciate a genuine Soviet desire to maintain its security. However, peace zones and nuclear free zones are elements of the Kremlin's wide-ranging fragmentation tactics undermining regional, hence global, stability by excluding the U.S. and Western sea powers from vital areas - even if achieved one small step at a time. A map of the world with the Soviet Union at the center shows zones of peace naturally complementing the already overwhelming zones of active and passive defenses that encircle that nation.

There has been a modicum of success with nuclear weapons free zones, space being a case in point. Space, however, is not free of nuclear material. Are we to believe that nuclear powered satellites cannot be "converted" into nuclear weapons by flipping the toggle switch of a control panel on earth? Similar concerns need addressing before a nuclear weapons free zone is discussed regarding the open seas.

One of the best examples of a zone of peace is the demilitarization of the Great Lakes by the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817. Seldom mentioned, however, is the general disregard for this treaty's specific provisions since the American Civil War. How many Americans realize that the U.S. Navy had training aircraft carriers in the Great Lakes during World War II? The Rush-Bagot Treaty clearly illustrates that nations settle their political differences first, then sign arms control agreements in which technical or even significant violations are meaningless while the political climate remains comfortable. "Naval" arms control advocates should concentrate on the probable need to renegotiate this treaty with a divided Canada rather than suggesting "naval" arms measures between the superpowers.

Zones of peace, or nuclear free zones at sea, would also tend to undermine the NATO strategy of flexible response, which includes options other than immediate escalation to a major nuclear war if NATO faces conventional defeat on land. Retaining a full spectrum of war fighting options, including the ability to initiate limited nuclear war from the sea, remains in the best interests of NATO under the present terms of reference for the

Alliance. Nuclear free zones are generally proposed in areas that would make this option more difficult.

If the Soviets are fearful of Western naval capabilities and anxious to conduct serious negotiations, they should offer a quid pro quo of value. Soviet naval forces are neither central to Soviet decision-making nor an appropriate quid pro quo for reductions in the U.S. Navy. Soviet rail and road systems have been suggested but an even better asymmetrical reduction could be land-based first strike missiles that undermine the U.S. deterrent forces. If the U.S. felt more secure over its missiles and bombers, it would feel less compelled to sustain forces to attack Soviet SSBNs during the conventional phase of a war. Why do the Soviets need first strike missiles with a defensive military doctrine?

Restrictions on Technology

Other Soviet arms control proposals include limiting the technological development of strategic ASW. This proposal assumes we can somehow distinguish between "strategic" ASW and "tactical" ASW - tactical ASW characterized as hunting and eliminating submarines not carrying ballistic or long-range cruise missiles. Obviously, feckless proponents of this cavalier idea have little operational sea experience.

Attempting to regulate strategic antisubmarine warfare technology without imposing similar restrictions on operational or tactical antisubmarine warfare technology is neither practical

nor in the best interests of NATO nations. If the success of NATO defense strategy depends upon the reinforcement/resupply of Europe from North America in a conventional war, then the Allies will require the most advanced ASW warfare techniques to sail convoys across the Atlantic. If the U.S. and the U.K. remove combat troops from the continent, and NATO maintains its essential function, then the alliance will be even more dependent upon secure sea lines of communication. In contrast, The Soviet Union can fight in Europe without relying on vulnerable sea transportation and are thus in a better position to sustain ASW technology restrictions.

Similar arguments can be made regarding other threat areas. If the United States and NATO nations would like to maintain a forced or even a benign access capability to other areas in the world, then they must ensure that materials and supplies transported by sea can arrive with but minimal threat from submarines. There are some two hundred submarines afloat that do not belong to the world's superpowers.

If we agree to such restrictions, and accept increased vulnerability of our seaborne shipping, will arms control advocates agree to increase the capabilities of intercontinental air transportation and defense of the air ways? Probably not. Their likely recommendation would be to regulate air transportation as well, leaving us with no certain way to ensure that men and material can cross the open seas!

How can we even attempt to regulate the development of ASW technology so that it will be used to find only submarines not carrying strategic nuclear missiles? How can we regulate the passage of warships or state-owned merchant ships through the high seas and ensure that they are not searching for submarines when they must locate other ships to avoid collisions? How can we ensure that the Soviet Union will comply with such restrictions and what will we do if we discover one of their fishing vessels has reported sighting one of our submarines? The U.S. cannot gamble on surrendering its lead in ASW (or other) technological developments by agreeing to any such restrictions in a future arms control regime.

Restrictions on antisubmarine warfare technology will also demand unrealistic requirements for intelligence collection. How do we monitor Soviet laboratories? We cannot, with certainty, claim that we could detect noncompliance with restrictions on technology. If developing certain types of weapons or intelligence collection systems comprises the measure of effectiveness for ASW technology, and using history for a guide, then the legalistic strict constructionist USSR will simply develop alternative unregulated devices to achieve the same results.

There is a significant lesson here concerning actions regarding ballistic missile defense taken by the Soviet Union - despite ABM Treaty provisions. Most people in the West believe defense against ballistic missiles was outlawed by this Treaty. Intelligence collection concentrated on inspection measures of ABM defense as specified by the Treaty. We did not examine prolif-

eration and mobility of missiles and hardening of silos - alternative and unregulated means of defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, the Soviets achieved ballistic missile defense through methods not regulated by the treaty while the U.S. simultaneously gave up the goal of serious ballistic missile defense.

The Goals of Arms Control

Arms control does not alone connote the signing of treaties. Worthwhile arms control agreements should accomplish at least one of the following: reduce (1) the likelihood of war, (2) the consequences of war, and/or (3) costs. These measures should, however, be integrated into a national security policy related to the national security of our Allies. Costs to the American taxpayer and the Soviet government should likewise be reduced as Allies and former Allies increasingly assume a larger share of their overall defense burden.

A typical example used by lax and indifferent arms control enthusiasts to "demonstrate" the advantages of naval arms control is the Washington Naval Arms Conference.[18] The conference placed major constraints only on building then-"strategic" weapons - capital ships and aircraft carriers. There were no regulations concerning submarines and only limited restrictions on construction of other warships. The monetary savings by the U.S. achieved in the 1920s not building capital ships was offset by expenses of the 1930s naval arms buildup. Can we seriously argue then that the Washington Conference met any of the three fundamental goals of arms control? Of course not. Is the record any better if we

add the naval arms control provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, the 1930 and 1936 London Treaty and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement? No. None of the inter-war years naval arms control efforts met the three major objectives of arms control.

A major lesson learned from previous naval arms control agreements, however, is that they not only limit necessary preparation for deterrence, but also deter democracies from exposing totalitarian nations openly violating such agreements. During the inter-war period, Germany, Italy and Japan built many warships exceeding limits set forth in arms control and other treaties, a fact actively hidden by at least one major democracy. For example, Britain actually had an Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar drydock, weighed it, found it in excess of a 10,000 ton treaty limit, and hid their findings.[19] In another case, the Admiralty continued to record the incorrect and treaty-compliant tonnage for the German battleship Bismark even <u>after</u> it was sunk and the Royal Navy's Intelligence Division had examined the ship's logs and surviving crew.[20]

The record of all arms control is poor at best. The public is frequently confused by proponents who insist that adherence to a treaty is more important than ensuring the security of the nation. Technical debates over verification demand a great deal of attention with little or no thought ever given to ensuring compliance with the agreement. Verification is not the problem. I generally argue that we <u>can</u> verify non-compliance to a level that

would be accepted by an intelligence specialist. Compliance (politics) is the problem! What do we do the first time a Soviet submarine "inadvertently" strays into an ASW free zone? What do we do the fifteenth time it happens, since it is more than likely that we will do nothing the first time? Does it matter if the submarine strays in 1 mile or 100 miles; or for 10 minutes or 10 hours? Democracies always promise to expose violations (and do not always) and assume they will have strategic warning of any "significant" violations allowing rebuilding and rearming - which they rarely do until too late.

What Can Be Done Today?

First Steps

Actions are being taken to attain the real objectives of arms control. The exchange of military academicians is a useful and necessary first step. The USSR must help the West understand its new defensive military doctrine and strategy, and the internal debates over these issues. We must be assured that their doctrine and strategy are no longer based on offensive war-fighting concepts against the West designed to limit damage to the USSR by first-strike operations against U.S. forces. Military officers of both countries should continue to write on doctrine and strategy in each other's professional journals. Similar writings by civilian academics should also be encouraged.

Time alone will convince the U.S. that the new Soviet doctrine and strategy are supported by correlative force structure and deployment. We need to understand that the best way to deal

with the Soviets is to treat them as they see themselves, rather than in some theoretically "rational" manner that makes sense only to a civilian academic. We should not consider "educating" the Soviet military to different concepts of deterrence (they understand and reject our concepts) but rather deal with the Russian mindset on terms it respects.

Though the U.S. would like to see the concept of military vulnerability to strategic nuclear strikes accepted by the Soviet military and political leadership, so that the West can decide that Mutual Assured Destruction ("MAD") has finally been accepted as military doctrine by the USSR, it is up to the Soviets to demonstrate by both word and deed that their past behavior and policies have changed. Instead, the Soviets continue to repudiate deterrence theory and the vulnerability associated specifically with MAD and actively pursue measures, including those at sea, to defend their homeland against strategic nuclear strikes.

As a first step in accepting MAD, and settling first order questions first, the USSR can dismantle its most threatening first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles or cease deploying new land-based mobile missiles that might cause the U.S. to counter with similar systems. These would be the first steps in the move to arms control of forces at sea, since our ability to accept regulations at sea depends largely upon what happens on land.

Each superpower must recognize that its views of a logical deterrent posture might appear threatening to the other side.

Existing Soviet land-based ballistic missiles that directly threaten our Minutemen and Peacekeeper missiles; an extremely robust defense against bombers and cruise missiles; a commitment to ballistic missile defense, and an aggressive ASW research and development program; coupled with what we know was Soviet military strategy, are viewed by the West as aggressive measures toward capturing overall military superiority rather than merely providing a "reasonably sufficient" defense. Recent purported reductions in excessive Soviet military general forces capabilities and overseas deployments are significant unilateral confidence building measures and a step in the right direction but mere words are simply not enough.

The continued excessive capability in Soviet submarines and their new capability in aircraft carriers do not appear to the West to logically support a defensive doctrine and strategy. If General Secretary Gorbachev indeed had power to make significant and unilateral reductions in ground forces, even below what was being negotiated, why does he not pick up the phone and cancel construction of the new aircraft carriers and more modern offensive submarines?

Each side must monitor with extreme care the external images that its rhetoric, force structure, deployments and exercises portray to the other. Right now, there is a mismatch between naval forces and overall Soviet military strategy. The Soviets can make a case for the aircraft carriers under a defensive doctrine but it is equally true that they do not <u>need</u> such capa-

bilities and could perform the same missions with helicopters and land-based aviation. The enormous costs, size, and continued modernization of their undersea fleet staggers any logical attempt to comprehend it as a "defensive" force.

The recently publicized unilateral "reductions" in older Soviet fleet assets (obsolete ships and "harbor queens") has not been a serious arms control step at all. These "reductions" result in a leaner but meaner navy force structure.[21] If theories about deployments of ballistic missile submarines closer to the USSR are correct, the area of responsibility for sea control by the Soviet Navy decreases. Decreasing areas to be controlled coupled with a more efficient force structure, could increase the combat potential of the Soviet Union, albeit in a reduced area. When increased combat potential is viewed in relation to Soviet attempts to reduce the threat from the sea with arms control (a traditional Soviet measure to deal with the threat), we can see that the overall correlation of forces would improve in favor of the USSR and its security would be enhanced.[22]

If the West, or President Gorbachev, takes seriously the possible secession of republics from the USSR, then a first order "naval" and general arms control unilateral step is to plan for the orderly transfer and denial of military capability to the new independent republics. If the Ukraine becomes an actual independent republic, who controls the SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the associated nuclear warheads at the Derazhnya missile base?[23] Are there Soviet Navy nuclear weapons in Lithuania, and will these be kept by the Russians or will nuclear pro-

liferation be allowed? Is there a need to once again plan for Allied intervention in the Soviet Union to ensure the security of critical military hardware? Do we have procedures for Western intelligence agencies to communicate with the KGB if they uncover an impending loss of nuclear weapons to other armed forces within the Soviet Union?

Advocates of "naval" arms control need to wrestle and resolve the major problems subsumed in all of the above proposals before Soviet recommendations are taken seriously by the U.S. Additionally, they must consider a number of intrinsic questions discussing the technical details of specific proposals. For example, one of the most important considerations is, do the restrictions remain in place during an armed conflict? There are treaties and conventions that regulate the conduct of war and armed conflict and, by and large, these agreements govern during armed conflict. Do "naval" arms control proposals such as ASW free zones, etc. remain in force during a war or armed conflict? Can the nations of the world even agree on what constitutes a war or armed conflict?

The definition of war and armed conflict is likely to prove as elusive as a totally satisfying definition of a warship or innocent passage. There is still major disagreement between the nations on whether Coast Guard and KGB forces, national revenue service, auxiliary, or gray-painted merchant marine units (including those under charter to a military service) are, or should be, classified as warships. Similarly, despite years of histori-

cal precedents, treaties, and some notable international court cases, the right of innocent passage by warships through the territorial seas of another nation has yet to be settled to everyone's satisfaction.[24]

If superpowers can agree on definitions, their next move may be sharing war gaming and political/military simulation and analytic capabilities to hasten agreement on the impacts of proposed arms control restrictions. Such simulations would be necessarily guarded but they might prove prudent opportunities to understand how each side views military problems. More importantly, they might aid each side in developing measures of effectiveness needed to model the behavior of the other nation. These are all analogues of what must be done before major proposals for the regulation of arms at sea should even be discussed.

What Navies Might Risk

Even now there are some modest arms control measures that can be pursued, clearly peripheral measures that do not involve major or central military weapons systems. I would suggest that, at a minimum, all major navies and general staffs should be looking into these issues in case their governments demand participation in arms control negotiations. The following measures are assessed as less hurtful than more restrictive regimes currently being proposed.

The existing seventeen year old bilateral incidents-at-sea agreement, and recent high level meetings between the military staffs of the superpowers appear as constructive moves to mini-

mize potential crises arising from military operations and maximize communications on a professional level. These agreements could be signed on a bilateral basis by all major sea powers, with eventual negotiation of a multilateral agreement open to all maritime nations. Expanding the incidents-at-sea agreement to include non-interference with submarine or aircraft operations might also be examined and evaluated.

Open exchange of non-sensitive data, such as the names, classes, and homeports of major ships, can also be non-threatening to the U.S. Navy since this data is generally known. It might be nice to have an official list of all Soviet fleet units with their current status (active, reserve, decommissioned, mothballed, etc.), actual name, ship rank, and home fleet. Currently, this information is obtained by each side from intelligence sources. If we can exchange similar data for strategic nuclear forces (and even more for theater nuclear), why not build confidence by understanding each other's naval force structure? Perhaps it would help the West understand just how many of those innocent looking merchant type ships in the Soviet inventory are actually naval auxiliaries, and not "civilian" noncombatants.

Although nuclear free zones or zones of peace may not necessarily be in the West's best interests, they represent a reasonable fallback position should Western navies be strongly encouraged to engage in "naval" arms control by insistent governments. Simply put, it is far better to promise to not deploy nuclear (or other) weapons in specific geographic locations than to not <u>build</u>

them at all, if you feel that nuclear weapons are central to deterrence. Should the agreement fail, it is easier to recover from the former than the latter. It would also be useful to see exactly which areas of the world's oceans the Soviet government is willing to tell its Navy that it can no longer inhabit. Let Admiral Chernavin fight this issue with his own government - not deceitfully make this a U.S. Navy vs. the world issue.

Another concept worth exploring is no first nuclear use at sea. I believe it is not in the interest of the U.S. Navy, or any Western navy, to fight a nuclear war at sea. The Soviet Union probably would benefit most if it were to go nuclear and launch the first strike at sea, yet it promises not to go nuclear first. If the U.S. or NATO promises to not go nuclear first at sea, and ties the deterrence of nuclear war at sea (as it does now) to a threat to expand the war to shore, then this would probably be reasonably acceptable to our own and NATO strategists. Still, the principle of flexible response would be undermined. Given the current events in Europe, we might accept more risk and be less explicit about our means of deterrence.

Perhaps the U.S. Navy could suffer the loss of some of its tactical nuclear weaponry at sea, which is what we are doing anyway. Although it might be argued that this reduction should be a part of an arms control regime instead of a unilateral budgetary or programming action, I believe that unilateral reciprocal steps made by each nation is the better way. While doing away with nuclear weapons at sea, we must guard against too

deep reductions, which could affect our war-fighting needs or our deterrence of tactical nuclear war at sea.

The disposal of naval nuclear reactors is another topic that might be scrutinized since it is in the best interests of all governments and navies to ensure that this is done safely and with minimal environmental impact. Although not a specific step to control naval arms, it is a useful first step and confidence building measure.

Agreements on the notification of ballistic missile tests, and on the prevention of dangerous military activities, were recently signed by the superpowers. Perhaps we can agree as well on advance notification of major naval exercises. Notification might be limited to those which the other side finds most threatening, such as flushing of all Soviet SSBNs from port to deployed bastions, or conducting a fleet-size ASW exercise by NATO in waters close to the USSR. Although advance notification clearly undermines the principle of freedom of the seas, if navies are asked to accept some restrictions, it is better to promise to notify prior to an exercise rather than to have the exercise canceled for lack of governmental support.

Past experience, but with advance notification of exercises regulated by the existing Helsinki and Stockholm accords, should form the backdrop for negotiations.[25] If we already exchange inspectors because of the Helsinki and Stockholm agreements and the new INF Treaty, why not exchange additional data during major exercises, or challenge inspections which are likely to be ob-

served in any case by these inspectors? It should be to both side's advantage to receive these inspection reports right.

Nations may even risk open confirmation that some of their major warships do not carry nuclear weapons. Currently, nuclear capable navies neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of such weapons aboard their bases, ships, aircraft or vehicles. Yet U.S. Army and Air Force denials to other countries that bases or forces are nuclear capable are commonplace, albeit on a general and not specific basis. As a start, the Soviet Union might confirm that its non-gray painted, civilian-manned, merchant-type ships that are actually naval auxiliaries - and therefore warships under the Law of the Sea Treaty - do not carry nuclear armaments when they visit European or Asian ports to obtain consumables for Soviet fleet units. Again, let us make this a problem for the Soviet Navy to deal with and keep the Western navies out of the press on the issue.

A final area into which we might have to look is permissive action links (PALs). PALs must receive an active signal to fire of a nuclear device. PALs are found on strategic bombers and in the system to launch land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although generally impractical for our SSBNs (and an emotional issue for the crews involved), how have we accepted this principle with sea-based cruise missiles? PALs are one more component that might break down, or be targeted for interference. They thus provide another opportunity for ballistic missile defense and strategic ASW for the Soviets. Yet, might we not compromise and accept PALs rather than risk more degrading meas-

ures? Would the West not feel more secure, should the Soviet government or CPSU prove incapable of future governance, if Soviet SSBNs could not fire without such a device? To ensure that this is the case in the now unstable USSR, it may be worth the price of inserting PALs on Western SSBNs.

The Case Against Stonewalling

The U.S. government must develop non-threatening positions on arms control, minimizing any possible impact on our fleets to perform peacetime and wartime missions. To do that, the government and the Navy needs to participate in the debate as an active partner. Arms control for the Navy has no merit, is not a good idea, and we must ensure that the fleet is not emasculated by well-meaning proponents of "naval" arms control.

The fleets of the world are being hobbled and undermined substantially by budgetary reductions, yet navies understand that they must be a major participant in that process, to minimize the unctuous intemperate actions of the normal political process. Navies cannot run the risks of having governments concur in arms control decisions without the discerning expert counsel of the leaders of the sea services. From without, it might appear that the leadership of the U.S. government and Navy is afraid of arms control and either will not or cannot partake in the debate for fear of bureaucratic ineptitude or inarticularity. These are difficult and unpalatable for the Navy but so are budget cuts.

If the U.S. Defense Department and Navy remains aloof from the debate, it is possible that a new model will develop for military participation in politics. This new model is prevalent in other nations; a model wherein academics and the politically aware public debate issues, influencing the government through elected officials and decision makers, with the bureaucracy expected to enforce these decisions. Rightly or wrongly, the U.S. military is an active participant in political debate. Is the Department of Defense or the Navy willing to surrender participation in that debate and not present convincingly any institutional opinions? I suggest that there are such ministries of defense and navies in the world and that the U.S. ought not to proceed down that specious path.

The U.S. should get the Soviet Navy involved in the arms control process to clearly identify their preferences. We might learn that the Soviet Navy shares many of the same reservations about arms control that the U.S. government does. Unfortunately, the debate as now structured points to the U.S. government, and especially the Navy, perceived as the only obstacle to a sea services agreement between the superpowers. Let us put Admiral Chernavin in the spotlight and explain publicly why he is either in favor or cutting aircraft carriers or submarines or not. Let the internal Soviet debate, for a change, include what the Soviets are willing to give up instead of what they want from the West.

We must disclaim the perception that the U.S. is stonewalling on arms control, if only to ensure that the train does not

leave the station without the fleet. Fortunately, the Navy is involved in serious internal staff work on all these issues and will be well equipped to respond to policy questions of the next few years. Navies should not float outside the mainstream political process involving possible arms control but must explain frankly and in uncomplicated terms to those more comfortable with military operations ashore why certain concepts are not transferable to the sea services. It is not up to the land-oriented to learn about the sea but rather for the fleet to explain its special circumstances to others.

Most importantly, we must think through the "naval" arms control issues and move ahead of the Soviets in more effectively handling the press, while informing the Western and American public of the issues involved. Well-founded alternative proposals should be presented by active-duty naval officers with help from civilian academic personnel and arms control supporters. The U.S. cannot refuse to participate in the "naval" arms control debate.

Conclusions

The issues involved with "naval" arms control suggestions, discussed herein, demonstrate the growing complexity of modern warfare. Neat distinctions between the offense and defense or even nuclear and non-nuclear warfare and warfare in one theater are almost meaningless without consideration of the remainder of the equation. If warfare is this complex, it is obvious that we cannot consider arms control with such outmoded concepts as regulations involving only certain areas of the world, or certain

types of weapons systems. From an intellectual perspective, all future crises and wars between the superpowers will be both automatically global and nuclear. In some of them, the crisis or war will have not expanded to a new area of confrontation and, optimistically, in all of them the nuclear weapons have not yet been used.

In the absence of a comprehensive global arms control regime, I doubt whether it is wise or even possible to single out specific regions where naval operations should be regulated by new arms control measures. Naval forces are global and strategic and should be considered in their totality. In other words, geographic arms controls or those limited only to the superpowers or limited regions are <u>not</u> a good idea.

Naval forces, alone, should not be subjected to arms control measures lacking an outcome of political events in Europe, controls over nuclear forces, and the arms control process regarding land forces in Europe. The fleet does not exist for its own sake. Navies exist to affect events ashore and what is occurring ashore these days is major. Perhaps the best thing that naval officers can do is explain why we should not even use the term "naval" arms control.

A meaningful arms control agreement involving naval forces must be accompanied by a comprehensive plan regulating virtually all nuclear and non-nuclear forces and activities, and involve all nations, not just the two superpowers. Any nation currently allied with the U.S., and any nation desiring the option of

future aid from an American fleet, has a major stake in ensuring that the Soviets do not restrict U.S. maritime operations.

I believe the current or projected nuclear, or maritime, balance of forces between the U.S. and USSR both in the any single region and worldwide, is not so severe that immediate arms control is needed. Wars do not begin by events at sea. The two superpowers are adjusting to new technological opportunities and political realities and need time to attain mutual understanding.

It is an affection, capricious and fashionable in the U.S. and the West, to think of arms control in terms of a "non-zero sum game," in which one side gains no advantage over the other. However, the long history of arms control and the international political relations between nations teaches us, that arms control is a part of an overall national security strategy and properly belongs in the "zero sum game" camp. There one side can indeed gain an advantage over another. Arms control strategy is a competitive strategy where one side should be expected to gain an advantage over the other.

Where to start the arms control process? On the one hand, strategists often start with some concept of the threat. The strategist then tries to deal with this threat given the objectives assigned and the resources available. On the other hand, the arms controller often starts thinking about a sub-goal (usually a treaty) generally ignoring major goals (such as national security), the resources available, and threat. Both arms control enthusiasts and strategists are now being forced to begin

the process differently: with the output of the budgeter and legislatures - the resources available and not necessarily responsive to the threat or the goal. Good planning must enable the process to start anywhere, and not consider attainment of a sub-goal the culmination of the planning process.

Before we consider major agreements for the sea services, we should identify and settle the first- and second-order political and military questions. On the Soviet side; what structure will emerge from the crumbling political empire created by the communist parties; who is in charge of the USSR and for how long; have the Soviets really adopted live-and-let-live during peace; is defensive defense real, and what is the role of the Soviet Navy in a defensive military strategy?

The future of Europe needs to settle from its Kafkaesque changes before we engage in any negotiations over naval forces. What changes will the map reflect? Will the superpowers still have forces deployed to Europe in peacetime? Will NATO alter its function to guaranteeing security of Europe instead of defending borders? Will the Warsaw Treaty Organization fold?

On the U.S. side; will we continue a struggle with the USSR during peacetime if they renounce their goals of world socialism and communism and adopt a market economy? Will the U.S. withdraw from Europe? If so, should we continue to act as a world policeman - or return to isolationism and a purely maritime strategy? What kind of Navy will be left after budget decisions currently being made take effect, and how will that constrain the objec-

tives and goals we can attempt to achieve, let alone the strategies that could be pursued?

If we accept those goals of arms control, we should note that unilateral actions taken by the superpowers are achieving the desired results - without the necessity for any formal agreements. The risk is low of a major war involving the superpowers or their Allies, and continues to decline. Nevertheless, the consequences of war, if one were to break out, are much reduced due to the demobilization of personnel and dismantling or mothballing of forces. The final goal of arms control, reduction of military costs, is a given.

As long as we are enjoying the goals of arms control without formal negotiations and treaties, there is no reason to complicate the process. Until we fully understand the internal changes in Mikhail Gorbachev's emerging "restructured" Soviet Union, there is be nothing so threatening about the political/military situation ashore or at sea that requires us to attempt "naval" arms control.

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.

(2) For example, see a 1961 pathbreaking book by Thomas C. Shelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon, 1985 reprint, p. 1.

(3) This question, of course, is of interest to nations which have agreements with Canada.

(4) Fred Ikle, Discussion of Collection contained in Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action, Roy Godson, Ed., Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989, p. 63.

(5) For reports of this conference see Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Report at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of July 25, 1988, contained in "The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy," and his "Closing Speech by Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze of July 27, 1988," both in Moscow International Affairs in English, No. 10, October 1988.

(6) Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, interview "We Share the Same Tasks" in Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, February 11, 1990, 1st Ed., p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-90-032, February 15, 1990, pp. 117-119).

(7) Georgi M. Sturua, "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed," remarks presented at the Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security Conference sponsored by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies of Dalhousie University, June 27, 1990, Halifax, Nova Scotia. This specific comment is absent from his written draft paper dated June 28, 1990 (6 pp.).

(8) The President of the United States has apparently declared these statements as authoritative - "The Soviet Union . . . has repudiated its doctrines of class warfare and military superiority . . . - contained in National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington: The White House, March 1990, p. 9.

(9) Additionally, these proposals should not be evaluated only by the government but by specialists outside the bureaucracy. This is not to say that internal reviews will not be comprehensive but those outside the procurement and promotion systems should make similar evaluations allowing Congress and the President to compare recommendations.

(10) Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev, contained both in "The Doctrine of a New Policy,"

Warsaw Zolnierz Wolnosci in Polish, November 9, 1989, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-89-221, November 17, 1989, p. 108) and "Our Military Doctrine," Moscow Agitator Armii I Flota in Russian, No. 24, 1989 (FBIS-SOV-90-021, January 31, 1990, p. 115).

(11) Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei. G. Gorshkov, Ed., The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment in Russian, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1988 (NIC translation, pp. 27-33) and Captain 2nd Rank V. Dotsenko, "Soviet Art of Naval Warfare in the Postwar Period," Moscow Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, No. 7, July 1989, pp. 22-28 (NIC-RSTP-113-89, pp. 31-39).

(12) The abbreviation SLOC refers to the sea lines of communication; PVO refers to the Soviet Air Defense Troops; and SSBN means strategic nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine. Anti-SSBN operations are often referred to as strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW).

(13) James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, 282 pp. A recent thesis used content analysis methodology to update these findings. See Louis D. Marquet, "The Strategic Employment of the Soviet Submarine Force," Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1988, 127 pp. Three additional theses also examined this assumption and validated this conclusion. See David A. Hildebrandt, "The Soviet Trend Toward Conventional Warfare and the Soviet Navy: Still no Anti-SLOC?" Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1988, 172 pp., William B. Walker, "The New Soviet Military Doctrine and the Future of the Maritime Strategy," Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1988, 229 pp., and Walter M. Kreitler, "The Close Aboard Bastion: A Soviet Ballistic Missile Deployment Strategy," Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1988, 114 pp.

(14) James J. Tritten, "Are Nuclear and Nonnuclear War Related?" The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 1988, pp. 365-373.

(15) See Brent A. Ditzler, "Naval Diplomacy Beneath the Waves: A Study of the Coercive Use of Submarines Short of War," Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1989, 117 pp. for an excellent example of a submarine officer attempting to justify submarines for their use in naval diplomacy.

(16) Alexi Arbatov, "How Much Defense is Sufficient?" Moscow International Affairs in English, No. 4, April 1989, p. 42 (this article appeared in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn in March 1989).

(17) D.P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law of Sea Power, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1975, p. 76.

(18) Paul G. Johnson, "Arms Control: Upping the Ante," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 109, No. 8, August 1983, pp. 28-34.

(19) Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II -

The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 371.

(20) Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 99-100 and Barton Whaley, Covert German Rearmament, 1919-1939: Deception and Misperception, Frederick, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984, pp. 91-93.

(21) For an interesting commentary by the Soviet Minister of Defense on the types of forces that the USSR is dismantling, see "Ostankino Radio Studio on the Line," phone-in program with Dmitriy T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense with commentator Boris Kondratov - broadcast live on Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1100 GMT, February 17, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-036, February 22, 1990, p. 107) emphasis added:

> "As for the reductions and scrapping of military hardware, yes indeed some of the hardware that has seen out its prescribed service life is being destroyed, sent for melting down. But what tanks are these? The T-34, T-54, old models of the T-55, T-10. But all the new hardware will remain. Moreover, any hardware that is still serviceable is not being withdrawn from the Armed Forces. As you recommend, it is being mothballed and, should the need arise, will be used.

(22) These thoughts have not been lost on the Soviet military. See Major I. Sas report, "Restructuring Demands Action, Meeting of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Party Aktiv," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, August 13, 1988, first edition, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-88-158, August 15, 1988, pp. 71-72). It is not clear from this report if the source of the comments is then-Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev or one of the ten other speakers. This theme is repeated, however, by Akhromeyev in two virtually identical articles printed outside the USSR. See "The Soviet Union is Not Lowering Its Guard," Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet in Swedish, November 30, 1988, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-88-234, December 6, 1988, p. 119) and "Restructuring Requires Action," Sofia Narodna Armiya in Bulgarian, December 6, 1988, pp. 1, 4 (FBIS-SOV-88-237, December 9, 1988, p. 1).

(23) Facility identified in the Department of Defense Soviet Military Power - 1987, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987, p. 25. The Soviets have printed a list of their own in an article by L. Kolpakov, "Glasnost-90: The Secrets Costs a Ruble," Moscow Vechernyaya Moskva in Russian, January 31, 1990, p. 2 (JPRS-UMA-90-008, April 3, 1990, p. 40).

(24) LCDR Ronald D. Neubauer, JAGC, USN, "The Right of Innocent Passage for Warships in the Territorial Sea: A Response to the Soviet Union," Naval War College Review, Vol. XLI, No. 2, Spring 1988, pp. 49-56.

(25) The Soviets argued that an article in Pravda constituted the required notification of their ZAPAD-81 exercise and that this exercise was actually an amalgamation of smaller exercises whose size did not warrant notification.

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